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NORTHCAROLINA LAW REVIEW
.As a. result of Idlewild, appeal to the court of appeals now pro-
vides, a complete remedy wheA, a district judge improperly refuses
to convene a three judge court. If the court of appeals finds that
the--single judge did not have jurisdiction, it can proceed with the
merits. If a three judge court is proper, it can be so ordered.
There is no need to delay proceeding by seeking mandamus from
the Supreme Court ffor mandamus does not consider the merits;
it merely orders the convening of a three judge court.
The procedural result of Idlewild is a much needed simplifica-
tion of review procedure. Procedural pitfalls and piecemeal deter-
mination have been eliminated and an uncertain area made uniform
and clear.
CHARLES MONROE WHEDBEE
Pleadings-Alternative Joinder of Defendants
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has again considered
the application of the alternative joinder of defendants statute1 in
Conger v. Travelers Ins. Co.2 Prior to the decision, the status of
the statute was very questionable.3 The instant case has done much
to sweep aside the confusion.
In Conger, the plaintiff alleged alternatively two causes of action.
In. the first clause, plaintiff alleged that she was the named bene-
ficiary of a group life insurance policy issued by the defendant,
Travelers, which policy insured the life of deceased; that the
deceased died while the policy was fully effective; that payment to
fhe plaintiff under the terms of the policy had been refused by
Tiravrelers; and that the plaintiff was entitled to full payment from
Trayelers in the amount of $8000. In the second cause of action,
50 Apparently mandamus is still available, to petitioner. See cases cited
note 21 supra. However, mandamus will usually iot issue where appellate,
reyv-ew is available, even though the Court can, in its discretion, issue the
writ in exceptional and appropriate cases. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318.
U.S. 578 (1943); Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932). in.
Idlewild'the Court granted both certiorari and heard the petition for man-'
d.rpus.. 3,68 U.S. 812'(1961).
-.':'N.C. iRN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953).'
"-"'260 N.C.J l12, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963).
State x rel Cain r. Corbett, 235 N.C. 33, 69 S.E.2d 20 (1952); Foote
v. C. W. "Davis & Co.,"230 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.2d 311 (1949) (Although the"
cburtr did not construe the irtatute,' it was a case for the application of the
statute.); Peitzman v. Town of Zebulon, 219 N.C. 473, 14 S.E.2d 416
(i941) ;" Smith Iv. Greensboro Joini Stock Land Bank, 213 N.C. 343, 196
S.E. 481 (1938); Grady v. Warren, 201 N.C. 693, 161 S.E. 319 (1931).
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the plaintiff alleged alternatively that if Travelers was not liable
to the plaintiff for the $8000, then the defendant, Colonial Stores,
was liable. Pursuant to this allegation the plaintiff pleaded that
the deceased had a contract with Colonial Stores whereby Colonial
Stores was to deduct a certain amount per week from deceased's
salary to pay a portion of the premiums of the insurance policy; that
Colonial Stores had, in fact, so deducted the amount up to thirty-one
days prior to deceased's death; and that if Colonial Stores had not
remitted the premiums to Travelers in accordance with the contract,
then Colonial Stores should be liable to the plaintiff for the $8000,
Both Travelers and Colonial Stores demurred to the complaint
on the ground that there was a misjoinder of causes and parties.
The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed.
The opinion of the court, in effect, summarized the case law
of North Carolina on alternative joinder of defendants, clearing up,
to some extent, several prior irreconcilable decisions which were
the subject of two previous articles in the Review.' The court
considered in great detail the effect that the statutory provision
that "all causes must affect all parties"5 has upon section 1-69' of
the General Statutes authorizing alternative joinder of defendants.
Thus the main issue in the case was whether or not, in the case of
alternative joinder of defendants, all causes must affect all parties;
and if they must, did they-do so here.
In its decision, the court has reconciled the two sections by
saying that both causes, though phrased in the alternative, do in
fact, affect both parties. This is true in the sense that if one de-
' Brandis and Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REV. 405, 422
(1956); Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Caro-
lina, 25 N.C.L. REv. 1, 43 (1946).
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953): "The plaintiff may unite in the
same complaint several causes of action .... But the causes of action so
united . .. must affect all the parties to the action ......
a N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953): "All persons may be made defendants,
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim, an interest in
the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to a
complete determination or settlement of the questions involved. In an
action to recover the possession of real estate, the landlord and tenant may
be joined as defendants. Any person claiming title or right of possession
to real estate may be made a party plaintiff or defendant, as the case
requires, in such action. If the plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from
whom he is entitled to redress, he may join" two or more defendants, to de-
termine which is liable."
19631
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fendant is held liable, the other cannot be held liable. The court
so held and denoted the theory as "mutual exclusiveness" of
remedies.7
Prior to Conger, in Grady v. Warren," the court had indicated
that section 1-69 could be applied only where a single cause of
action is stated.' This indication was negated by a subsequent
decision in Peitzman v. Town of Zebulon.'0 In Peitzman, the
plaintiff sued the Town of Zebulon on a contract. Later he amended
to join an ex-mayor of the town and ex-city clerk as additional
parties defendant."1 Plaintiffs joined the former officers in a
second cause of action for wrongfully making and inducing the
plaintiff to enter into the contract. Thus, there were alternative
defendants, and two causes of action, one in contract and one in
tort. The court allowed the joinder, and treated the two causes as
arising out of the same transaction, thereby complying with the
requirements for joinder of causes.'"
The Peitznan decision left this question unanswered: Could
there be alternative joinder of parties and causes where there were
alternative facts ?"s Concerning this point the court said in Peitz-
man, "There are no alternative facts alleged, the only alternative
involved under the allegations is as to which of the defendants is
liable." 4 The court in Conger realized that Peitzman had not said
that there could be no alternative joinder if there were alternative
facts. It would appear, however, that the heretofore unanswered
question has now been settled by Conger:
The alternative causes are not separate and distinct; they are
so interwoven that if one defendant is liable the other is not.
Of course, neither may be liable. It seems to us that this com-
plaint, though it contains alternative factual allegations, discloses
1260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963). For a full discussion
of the "mutual exclusiveness" doctrine to which the court refers, see
Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25
N.C.L. Rzv. 1, 43 (1946).
8201 N.C. 693, 161 S.E. 319 (1931).
8260 N.C. 112, 114, 131 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1963).
1 219 N.C. 473, 14 S.E.2d 416 (1941).
" Plaintiff amended only after the town answered alleging that the
former officers had made the contract without authority. Ibid.
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953): "But the causes of action so united
must ... affect all parties to the action ...
1825 N.C.L. R!v. 1, 45 (1946).
14219 N.C. 473, 475, 14 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1941).
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one of the situations for which G.S. § 1-69 was passed sixty-three
years after G.S. § 1-123.15
In other words, where there is a single interwoven transaction,
with mutual exclusiveness of the causes, the causes may be joined
in the alternative in spite of alternative factual allegations.
Conger supplies the answer to a further question. Smith v.
Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank 6 had been decided prior to
Peitzman. It involved a joinder of defendants which, from the
facts,' 7 would appear to have been a case for alternative joinder,
although the decision did not mention this fact. Instead, the court
treated the case as a joinder of inconsistent and contradictory causei
of action, and sustained a demurrer for misjoinder.'8 Acknowl-
edging that Smith did, in fact, involve an alternative joinder of
causes, the court in Conger admits that Smith and Peitzman pose
inconsistent rules, but follows Peitzman because "it seems to us to
reach the conclusion most likely to expedite the prompt administra-
tion of justice."' 9
There is at least one problem left unsolved by Conger in the
alternative joinder field: Will the reasoning applied in Conger be
applicable to an alternative joinder of plaintiffs? Foote v. C. W.
Davis & Co.2" apparently involved alternative claims of two plain-
tiffs.2 The court, however, sustained a demurrer for misjoinder
on the grounds of inconsistency of causes without mentioning al-
ternative joinder of parties plaintiff.2" The language of the court
on the point of inconsistency is interesting: "There is no joint or
1260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
16213 N.C. 343, 196 S.E. 481 (1938).
"'In Smith, the plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that the
defendant bank had foreclosed his mortgage without sufficient power of
sale; that at the foreclosure sale, the bank bought the property through its
agent; and that the property had subsequently been conveyed to the other
defendants in the action. The plaintiff asked in this cause that the sale and
subsequent deeds be set aside. In the second cause, the plaintiff sought
damages against the defendant bank only if it were found that the pur-
chasers from the bank's agent were innocent.
16213 N.C. 343, 346, 196 S.E. 481, 482 (1938).
10260 N.C. 112, 118, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
20 230 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.2d 311 (1949).
'In Foote, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Davis, had breached
its contract to buy prunes from the plaintiff. Because Davis set up in de-
fense to the action an allegation that the plaintiff was not the real party
in interest and that the plaintiff was the mere selling agent for Guggen-
hime, plaintiff had Guggenhime joined as a party plaintiff. Obviously, either
one or the other, or neither, but not both in any case, was entitled to recover.
- 230 N.C. 422, 423, 53 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1949).
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common interest in the claim asserted. Instead, each contradicts the
other. If Foote's claim is well-founded, Guggenhime has no in-
terest therein .. ".. 23 This statement would indicate an alternative
joinder, as the language, in effect, is the "mutual exclusiveness"
doctrine.
24
That Foote would be controlling in the wake of the Conger
decision is doubtful. Since Conger, however, was limited to a case
of alternative joinder of defendants, some distinction might be made
by the court due to the different wording of the statutes2 5 Section
1-69 of the General Statutes provides for alternative joinder of de-
fendants if the plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from whom he is
entitled redress, whereas section 1-68 contains no such "doubt
clause" regarding the joinder of plaintiffs. Rationally, this distinc-
tion should make no difference whatsoever.20
A reconsideration of the problem raised by Foote is still needed.
As the situation now stands, multiple defendants may be joined in
the alternative without the worry of having a demurrer for mis-
joinder sustained either on the ground that alternative facts have
been alleged, or on the basis that the plaintiff is proceeding upon
inconsistent theories. The only requirement is that there be "mutual
exclusiveness" of remedies.2 7 The same rule should apply to altern-
ative joinder of plaintiffs, and Conger should be good authority
for avoiding the Foote situation. Further consideration by the
court is necessary, however, before it would be completely safe to
2 Ibid. It must be noted that in Foote there were two separate com-
plaints, and not merely one complaint with causes joined in the alternative.
If this was the basis of the court's ruling that the claims were inconsistent,
it would appear that if the claims were encompassed in a single complaint
phrased in the alternative, the court would overrule a demurrer.
24260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963): "They [the causes]
are so interwoven that if one defendant [plaintiff] is liable [entitled to
recover] the other is not."
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-68 (1953): "All persons having an interest
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be
joined as plaintiffs, either jointly, severally, or in the alternative .... "
Compare this with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953): "All persons may be
made defendants, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim,
an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff .... If the plaintiff
is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may
join two or more defendants, to determine which is liable." (Emphasis
added.)
28 34 N.C.L. Rav. 405, 424 (1956): "[T]he mere authorization of alterna-
tive joinder of plaintiffs so plainly contemplates a comparable uncertainty,
that such a ground of distinction seems highly improbable."
'260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
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say that the attorney could forget the inconsistency notion in alterna-
tive joinder of plaintiffs.
'It would seem that by the Conger decision, North Carolina,
in the alternative joinder situation, is becoming more liberal, per-
haps even approaching the liberality of the Federal Rules.2" It is
hoped that the court will continue "to reach the conclusions most
likely to' expedite the prompt administration of justice."29
ARCH K. ScHocH IV
Quasi-Contract-Expense of Medical Care of Indigent Parent
During the last illness of a parent, it is not unusual for his
children to assume his medical bills. In Deskovick v. Porzio1 the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, recently con-
sidered an action to recover such expenses brought by two adult sons
against the estate of their father, on an alleged contract for repay-
ment.
The decedent's illness made his sons reluctant to discuss money
matters with him and testimony indicates that they were erroneously
led to believe that their father was unable to pay his medical bills.2
They assumed and paid the bills, allegedly intending to have an
accounting at some unspecified future date. Since the estate left
by the decedent was more than sufficient to cover his medical
expenses3 they sought recovery, basing their action on a theory of
contract implied in fact.' There could have been no such contract,
" 2 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 533, at
193 (1961). Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was en-
acted in contemplation of procedural economy and provided for, among
other aspects, the alternative joinder of defendants. The authors cite Payne
v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K.B. 1, as the forerunner of Rule
20(a). Payne is interesting, therefore, from a historical point of view.
In Payne, plaintiff supplier ordered cards from manufacturer for a cus-
tomer from a sample furnished by manufacturer. On arrival, customer
refused acceptance, alleging variance from the sample. The British court
allowed joinder of customer and manufacturer in the alternative, realizing
that the case, as in Conger, presented one common question: Did the cards
furnished meet the specifications of the sample? This is a case of "mutual
exclusiveness," because recovery against one would definitely preclude re-
covery against the other.
" 260 N.C. 112, 118, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
'78 N.J. Super. 82, 187 A.2d 610 (App. Div. 1963).
2 Id. at 85-86, 187 A.2d at 611-12.
8 Id. at 89, 187 A.2d at 613.
'"Contracts are express when their terms are stated by the parties and
are often said to be implied when their terms are not so stated. The dis-
19631
